JD Vance’s Foreign Policy Is a Glass Half-Full

Former President Donald Trump has selected Ohio Senator J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential running mate for the 2024 election. Much has been written about Senator Vance’s foreign policy positions — the “good” and the “bad;” however, as Hamlet said, “there is no good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” 

To reduce the complexity inherent in foreign policy decisions to a binary choice between good or bad tends to be intellectually lazy and politically expedient. Further, it is almost always more reflective of the judge rather than the judged.   

For instance, Senator Vance has been highly critical of US support for Ukraine’s war against Russia. In fact, he said, “I don’t care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other.”  Whether that was said with shock value in mind, or he really doesn’t care that Ukraine could fall to Putin is up for debate. But, are we to believe that such a statement accurately or fairly encapsulates what he thinks about Ukraine’s war with Russia?  

Rhetoric aside, his foreign policy positions are likely to propel expanding Israel-Europe relations in a steeper direction.  

Vance is a notably proud supporter of Israel, and his public statements about Israel are the antithesis of those he makes about Ukraine. He called Israel, “one of the most dynamic and technologically advanced countries in the world” and “[t]he idea that there is ever going to be an American foreign policy that doesn’t care a lot about that slice of the world is preposterous because of who Americans are.” Vance is also on record fully supporting Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza until Hamas is dismantled and no longer presents a military threat. 

So, what are we to make of Vance? He does not seem to fit squarely in the isolationist camp. His positions have been informed by his military experience fighting in Iraq, and he understands foreign policy to the extent that he lived the consequences of previous US foreign policy decisions. Even on Ukraine, he’s not completely isolationist.   

Vance falls in an ascending category of foreign policy thinkers, called conservative realists, a term coined by Elbridge Colby, himself a highly regarded “conservative realist.” In fact, conservative realism helps explain the essential nature of the developing triad between Israel, Europe, and the US, and Vance articulates this quite well.  

At the February Munich Conference, Vance said, “[w]e need Europe to play a bigger share of the security role, and that’s not because we don’t care about Europe … it’s because we have to recognize that we live in a world of scarcity,” insinuating that Europe can no longer hold onto “the idea of the American superpower that can do everything all at once.” 

In other words, his position on Ukraine could be a function of his belief that Europe must take more responsibility for protecting itself from external threats, because the United States no longer possesses the financial, military, operational, or political resources to allocate towards Europe’s security.  

On the other hand, Vance views Israel differently than Ukraine, and considers the US-Israel alliance as the model for a US-Europe alliance. He sums it up by saying, “[w]e have to sort of ask ourselves, what do we want out of our Israeli allies? And more importantly, what do we want out of all of our allies writ large? Do we want clients who depend on us, who can’t do anything without us? Or do we want real allies who can actually advance their interests on their own with America playing a leadership role?”  

According to Vance, Israel is relatively self-sufficient, unlike present Europe, where most countries have failed to meet their obligatory 2% of GDP threshold for defense spending. While Europe, writ large, is barely spending enough on its defensive capabilities, Israel is advancing new technologies like the Iron Beam, a laser defensive system that, according to Vance, is “a very important national security objective, and of the United States of America.”  

He hasn’t commented on whether he believes that Israel should keep receiving the same level of funding it does from the United States, or if he believes Israel should spend more of its own money on its defenses. However, past may be prologue: Vance criticized the Biden administration for withholding precision munitions to Israel, and Israel already spends more than 7% of GDP on defense spending.

Moreover, the annual $3.8B in military funding the US provides Israel is a pittance compared to the $175B in funding provided to Ukraine in just two years (although this aid includes more than military aid). Additionally, the US did approve another $8.7 billion to Israel from a supplemental act in April 2024.

If we are to read between the lines, Vance considers the Return on Investment from Israel to be significantly more than from Ukraine and would seem inclined to support continued aid to Israel. 

Vance is a glass half-full. In other words, while there are aspects of conservative realism that may be concerning, those concerns must be weighed against the potential benefits. Long-term, the benefits to Europe and Israel are likely to be significant.  

Europe will be forced to pursue opportunities to enhance their defense, security, and technological capabilities if these countries hope to withstand threats coming from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea — the “Quartet of Death,” as the British refer to them. This pivot clearly augurs for increased Israel-Europe alignment.   

In fact, 21 European countries have joined the European Sky Shield Initiative, a coalition to create a pan European air defense system, all of which is dependent on the inclusion of Israeli technology. Germany has the Arrow 3. Finland acquired David’s Sling, and the Baltic States want to acquire Iron Dome, and these steps are in addition to the robust defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and other forms of technological advancements taking place between Israel and Europe.   

What’s more, as a proponent of the Abraham Accords, Vance’s promotion of them would strengthen the relationships between Europe and Abraham Accords’ countries, thereby offering Europe potential friend-shoring advantages it presently does not possess.    

There are still almost four months to go before the US presidential elections, so how this plays out no one knows. However, current trends indicate we will likely see European leaders maneuvering their countries into positions that benefit Israel and the Israel-Europe relationship sooner than later.